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INSTRUMENTALITY STATUS UNDER THE FOREIGN SOVEREIGN

IMMUNITIES ACT OF 1976.

In 1970 plaintiff,1 Edlow International Company, obtained a supply of uranium for a Yugoslavian nuclear power plant operated by
defendant Nuklearna Elektrarna Krsko, a "workers organization" 2
created under Yugoslavian law. For its services, plaintiff was to
receive a brokerage fee which defendant refused to pay.3 Plaintiff
brought suit in United States District Court for the District of
Columbia to recover on the alleged agreement. Defendant moved
for dismissal on jurisdictional grounds, claiming that the court
lacked diversity jurisdiction.' Defendant also contended that subject matter jurisdiction did not exist because the organization did
not satisfy the definition of an agency or instrumentality of a
foreign sovereign according to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act of 1976.1 Plaintiff countered this assertion by claiming that
I A District of Columbia corporation
acting as a broker in connection with sales of
nuclear fuels.
2 CONSTITUTION OF THE SOCIALIST FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA, Art. XXXV defines
the work organization as follows: "An independent self-managing organization of workers
linked in labor by common interests and organized in basic organizations of associated
labor."
' In order to reap certain tax benefits, plaintiff billed defendant for its services through
its Bermuda subsidiary, Edlow Resources Ltd. Defendant then refused to pay claims on
grounds that plaintiff had not been a party to the sale of uranium.
' Defendant attacked diversity jurisdiction based on 28 U.S.C. 441 at 829 § 1332(a)(2)
(1970) which states:
(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where
the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between - (2) citizens of a state and citizens or subjects of
a foreign state.
Plaintiff's claim of a $24,000 brokerage fee satisfied the jurisdictional amount required,
but defendant asserted that since the real plaintiff was Edlow Resources, Ltd., a Bermuda
corporation, the court lacked diversity jurisdiction because no citizen of states were involved
in the litigation.
' Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602-11 (1976)

[hereinafter the Act]. The Act defines an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state as
follows:
Any entity which is a separate legal person, corporate or otherwise, and which is
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defendant met the definitional requirements of an "agency or instrumentality of a foreign state"' according to the Act, and that
the Act granted jurisdiction to the district court.7 Held, dismissed.
A foreign state's system of property ownership, without more,
should not be determinative on questions of whether an entity
operating in such state is a state agency or instrumentality under
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. Edlow InternationalCompany v. Nuklearna ElektrarnnaKrsko, 441 F. Supp. 827 (D.D.C.
1977).
In the second case plaintiff,8 Yessenin-Volpin, brought a libel action in the New York Supreme Court claiming that defendants,
Novosti Press Agency (Novosti),9 TASS Agency (TASS),' ° and The
Daily World, a newspaper of the Communist Party of the United
States, had printed materials injurious to him. Defendants
Novosti and TASS filed a petition for removal to the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York,
which was granted. Defendants Novosti and TASS then moved for
dismissal, asserting that under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act of 1976 they were agencies or instrumentalities of foreign
states" and therefore immune from jurisdiction. In light of the
an organ of a foreign state or political subdivision thereof, or a majority of whose
shares or other ownership interest is owned by a foreign state or political subdivision thereof, and which is neither a citizen of a state of the United States .
nor
created under the laws of any third country.
28 U.S.C. § 1603(b)(I)-(3) (1976).
6Id
28 U.S.C. § 1330(a) (1976) states:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction without regard to amount in
controversy of any nonjury civil action against a foreign state as defined in Section 1603(a) of this title as to any claim for relief in personam with respect to
which the foreign state is not entitled to immunity either under Sections
1605-1607 of this title or under any applicable international agreement.
An outspoken defender of the civil and human liberties of the Russian people.
Novosti Press Agency (hereinafter Novosti) is an information agency of Soviet public
organizations. It is organized under Articles 125 and 126 of the Constitution of the U.S.S.R.
which guarantees freedom of the press through control of mass media facilities and the
right to organize other public organizations such as Novosti. Novosti has fixed assets of 1.7
million roubles and the free use of property owned by the government valued at 3 million
roubles. Novosti's charter states that "no Soviet state organ bears responsibility for the
business activities and financial obligations or any other financial obligations or any other
actions of the Agency." Novosti Statute § III(10), quoted in Yessenin-Volpin v. Novosti
Press Agency, 443 F. Supp. 849 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
10 Tass Agency (hereinafter TASS) is an organ of the government of the U.S.S.R. whose
full name is the Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers.
Id at 852.
" See note 5, supra.
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evidence and case law, 2 plaintiff conceded TASS's claim of immunity, but countered Novosti's motion by asserting that defendant was not an agency of a foreign state according to the Act
because the Soviet state was not responsible for defendant and
that defendant was not an organ of the state. Held, dismissed.
Defendants, being essentially public in nature, may claim immunity. Yessenin-Volpin v. Novosti Press Agency, 443 F. Supp. 849
(S.D.N.Y. 1978).
The practice of granting immunity to foreign sovereigns is
"founded on an implied consent on the part of all sovereigns, as a
matter of comity, to a relaxation of the complete jurisdiction
which each naturally enjoys while within his own territory.' '
Under the theory of absolute sovereign immunity, a foreign
sovereign, without his consent, could not be brought into court
regardless of the nature of his act.'4 This theory of sovereign immunity quickly developed to cover all acts of a sovereign.
However, as early as 1812 Chief Justice Marshall recognized" that
The evidence primarily consisted of affidavits from Anatoliy Dobrynin, the Soviet Ambassador, which certified that TASS was an organ of the Soviet State. The British case law
relied upon was Krajina v. The Tass Agency, [1949] 2 All E.R. 274 (C.A.).
" Ulen & Co. v. Bank Gospodarstwa Krajowego, 261 App. Div. 1, 24 N.Y.S. 2d 201, 204
(1940).
" As of this writing, only the United Kingdom and the socialist states of Eastern Europe
and Asia accept the absolute theory of sovereign immunity. The socialist countries' position
is described in N. LEECH, C. OLIVER & J. SWEENEY. THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 308
(1973), which states:
Socialist states are committed to the "absolute theory" of sovereign immunity
and claim international law requires that it be granted even in cases where the
litigation arises from commercial activities. In many states in Western Europe
and elsewhere, however, the courts apply the "restrictive theory" and deny
immunity to socialist states-and other states-in litigation arising from such
activities. Socialist states look upon the denial of immunity in these cases as unwarranted interference with the conduct of their trade abroad through state
monopolies.
The United Kingdom signed the Council of Europe's European Convention on State Immunity and Additional Protocol on May 16, 1972 which adopted the restrictive theory of
sovereign immunity. Even so, one author says that "the United Kingdom has not, however,
at this time finally adopted the restrictive theory, notwithstanding significant recent decisions by courts leaning in that direction." von Mehren, Foreign Sovereign Immunites Act
of 1976, 17 COL. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 33, 39. (1978). But see Higgins, Recent Developments in
the Law of Sovereign Immunity in the United Kingdom, 71 Am.J. INT'L L. 423 (1977),
which states that Britain accepts the restrictive theory in in rem proceedings. See Trendtex
Trading v. Central Bank of Nigeria, [1977] 2 W. L. R. 356; see also The Phillipine Admiral,
[1975] 1 W. L. R. 1492.
" The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Crnch) 116 (1812).
"
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although absolute immunity was the norm, 6 there might be times
when a sovereign would undertake activities, such as the purchase of real estate in a foreign state, that place him within the
jurisdiction of the courts of the land." In 1891 the Institut de
Droit International recognized that there should be a distinction
between a state's acts as a trader and its acts as a sovereign."8
This idea, together with the trend of the case law in the first half
of this century, was expressed as the restrictive theory of
sovereign immunity. It was labeled the restrictive theory because
it granted immunity to foreign sovereigns with regard to public
acts only. If a foreign sovereign was involved in a suit arising
from private or commercial activity, he was not accorded immunity
and could be brought into court. The trend toward the restrictive
theory began developing quickly among the European community for three main reasons: 1) the increasing respect in civilized
states for the rule of law; 9 2) the expanding practice on the part of
governments of engaging in commercial activities;' and 3) the
emergence of the U.S.S.R. and its communist economy.2'
Until 1952, the United States had followed a policy of applying
the absolute theory of foreign sovereign immunity and allowing
the Department of State, rather than the courts, to decide questions of foreign sovereign immunity.'m In that year the Depart1

One sovereign being in no respect amendable to another; and being bound by
obligations of the highest character not to degrade the dignity of his nature by
placing himself or its sovereign rights within the jurisdiction of another, can be
supposed to enter a foreign territory only under an express license, or in the confidence that the immunities belonging to his independent Sovereign station,
though not expressly stipulated, are preserved by implication, and will be extended
to him.
Id. at 137.
17

A prince by acquiring private property within a foreign country, may possibly be
considered as subjecting that property to the territorial jurisdiction; he may be
considered as so far laying down the prince, and assuming the character of a
private individual.
Id. at 145.
" Hervey, The Immunity of Foreign States When Engaged in CommercialEnterprises:
A Proposed Solution, 27 MICH. L. REV. 751 (1929).
19 von Mehren, supra note 14.
20 Id.
21 E. ALLEN, THE POSITION OF FOREIGN STATES BEFORE NATIONAL COURTS, CHIEFLY IN CONTINENTAL EUROPE, 431 (1933) cited in Et Ve Balik Kurumu v. B.N.S. International Sales

Corp., 25 Misc. 2d 299, 204 N.Y.S. 2d 971, 977 (1960)), aff'd, 17 App. Div. 2d 1013 (1960). See
also Hervey, note 18, supra at 751.
n See von Mehren, note 14 supra at 41.
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ment of State issued a bulletin, 3 commonly refered to as the "Tate
Letter," announcing the adoption of the restrictive theory. The
State Department continued to determine questions of sovereign
immunity; however, ocassionally courts had an opportunity to rule
on sovereign immunity in cases in which the State Department
was neutral" or remained silent. 5 In doing so, problems arose as
to the classification of certain foreign enterprises. One such problem which confused courts deciding the question whether an
enterprise was an agency or instrumentality of a foreign
sovereign was the nature of the enterprise's organizational structure. In Krajina v. TASS Agency,2" a British court was faced with
the claim by TASS that it was an agency or instrumentality of the
U.S.S.R. and therefore immune from suit. The statute creating
TASS stated in one clause that TASS had "all the rights of a
juridical person,"' but in another clause stated that TASS was
"an organ of the U.S.S.R."" The court held for TASS despite the
contradictory statute on the basis of the Soviet
Ambassador's certification of TASS as a department of the Soviet
state and the lack of evidence to show that TASS was a separate
entity. Another judicially perplexing problem was that of determining what constituted commercial activity for the purpose of
applying the restrictive theory.'
,126 DEPT STATE BULL. 984 (1952). The "Tate Letter" was a letter from the acting legal
adviser of the Department of State to the Attorney General stating that in future the State
Department would use the restrictive theory for its decisions regarding sovereign immunity.
The letter noted the trend towards the restrictive theory and stated:
[T]he Department feels that the widespread and increasing practice on the part of
governments engaging in commercial activities makes necessary a practice which
will enable persons doing business with them to have their rights determined in
court. For these reasons it will hereafter be the Department's policy to follow the
restrictive theory of sovereign immunity in the consideration of requests of
foreign governments for a grant of sovereign immunity.
Id. at 985.
24 Ulen & Co. v. Bank Gospodarstwa Krajowego, 261 App. Div. 1, 24 N.Y.S. 2d 201 (1940).
' Victory Transport, Inc. v. Comisaria General de Abastecimientos y Transportes, 336
F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 934 (1965).
[1949] 2 All E.R. 274 (C.A.).
2 Id. at 277.
Id. at 276.
See Victory Transport, Inc. v. Comisaria General de Abastecimientos y Transportes,
336 F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1964). In that case, the court noted that the "Tate Letter" adopted the
restrictive theory of sovereign immunity, but offered no guidelines for differentiation between public and private acts of a sovereign. In order to clear up the resulting confusion,
the court established categories under which acts should fall if they are to be deemed public
acts. These categories are as follows:
1. Internal Administrative acts, such as expulsion of an alien.
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In the United States, after 1952, courts began taking different
and sometimes inconsistent approaches to these problems.30 Confusion concerning what constituted commercial activity prompted
the court in Victory Transport Inc. v. Comisaria General De
Abastecimientos y Transportes31 to set guidelines as to what activities could be classified as public activities in which the foreign
2
sovereign would be immune from suit.
One difficulty in distinguishing those enterprises which have
immunity from those that do not arose when an enterprise,
chartered under the laws of a communist country, claimed
sovereign immunity from suit. In these countries the state is
theoretically the sole owner of the means of production," there being no private ownership of property." This makes every
organization, in effect, an agency of the foreign sovereign possessing the opportunity to attain sovereign immunity.3" Generally
courts have been hesitant to declare such across-the-board immunity. In Stephen v. Zivnostenska Banka National Corp.,36 the
court questioned whether the enterprise was a "corporate jural
2. Legislative acts, such as nationalization.
3. Acts concerning the armed forces.
4. Acts concerning diplomatic activity.
5. Public loans.
The Act, supra note 5, defines commercial activity in this way:
[A] regular course of commercial conduct or a particular commercial transaction
or act. The commercial character of an activity shall be determined by reference
to the nature [emphasis added] of the course of conduct or a particular transaction
or act; rather than by reference Co its purpose.
28 U.S.C. § 1603(d) (1976).
3 In Petrol Shipping Corp. v. Kingdom of Greece, Ministery of Commerce, Purchase
Directorate, 360 F.2d 103 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 394 (1966), Greece's Ministry
of Commerce claimed immunity from lawsuit or contract for purchases and shipment of
grain, but immunity was denied. But in Isbrandtsen Tankers, Inc. v. President of India, 446
F.2d 103 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 985 (1971), the court upheld sovereign immunity
in an action based on a contract for grain shipments. The two cases were similar, but the
results opposite. For a fuller discussion, see Note, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
of 1976: Giving the Plaintiff His Day in Court, 46 FORDHAM L. REV. 543 (1977).
" 336 F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 934 (1965).
32 See note 29 supra.

1 G.

GUINS. SOVIET LAW AND SOCIETY

96 (1954). Guins described all legal entities and

their relation to the state as follows: "With few insignificant exceptions, the socialist state
is the sole owner of all means of production and is a trade monopolist. It is evident that all
legal entities in the Soviet Union are government enterprises though organized on a commercial basis."
"In a sense, the theory of communism may be summed up in the single sentence: Aboli-

tion of private property." K.

MARKS

& F.

ENGELS, THE COMMUNIST MANIFESTO

See note 33 supra.
15 App. Div. 2d 111, 222 N.Y.S.2d 128 (1961).

(1848).
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entity, separate and distinct from the Republic of
Czechoslovakia ' 37 and answered affirmatively. In Rovin Sales
Corp. v. Socialist Republic of Romania," Romania set up an enterprise, Vinexport, to sell and export wine. It was sued by Rovin for
breach of contract and Romania moved to dismiss on jurisdictional
grounds, claiming immunity. The court failed to consider the
potential ramifications of Romania's system of public ownership of
property, and held that the enterprise was a foreign sovereign
engaged in commercial activity, and therefore not immune to suits
on its contracts.39
In order to clarify the subject of foreign sovereign immunity
and codify pre-existing case law, Congress enacted the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976.' ° The purpose of the Act was
"to define jurisdiction of the United States in suits against foreign
states, the circumstances in which foreign states are immune from
suit, and in which execution may not be levied on their
property."" Specifically the Act defined "foreign state," set up the
scope of jurisdiction over these states, detailed immunity and its
exceptions, outlined the procedures for service of process on
foreign states, and codified pre-existing case law incorporating
the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity. The Act shifted the
responsibility for decisions on sovereign immunity from the State
Department to the courts,'2 thus attempting to remove the potential influence of political considerations, and providing both
parties an opportunity to be heard by a court of competent
jurisdiction.
The Edlow International and Yessenin-Volpin cases are the
first two post-Act cases in which the courts have grappled with
the problem of whether an organization founded in a communist
or socialist country is an agency or instrumentality of a foreign
state because of that country's system of public ownership of property. The plaintiff in Edlow Internationalattempted to establish
subject matter jurisdiction by showing that defendant is an agency or instrumentality of the Socialist Federal Republic of
Yugoslovia (Yugoslavia) under § 1603(a) of the Act. In order to

"

15 App. Div. 2d 120, 222 N.Y.S.2d at 137.
403 F. Supp. 1298 (N.D. Il. 1975).
Id. at 1302.
28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602-11 (1976).

*l /d.

H.R. Rep. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976), reprinted in 15 INT'L LEGAL MATLS
1398 (1976).
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qualify as an agency of a foreign state under § 1603(a) of the Act
the entity must pass a three-part, cumulative test: first, it must be
a "separate legal person;" second, it must be an organ of a foreign
state or owned by a foreign state; and, third, it must be neither a
citizen of the United States nor organized under the laws of any
third country. 3 In Edlow Internationa4 defendant was a workers'
organization which, under the constitution of Yugoslavia," is
neither state owned nor privately owned, but is "held and used in
trust by the work organization for the general social good of all
the Yugoslav people. ' 45 The plaintiff countered with the argument
that in a socialist country all property is ultimately owned by the
state and, therefore, NEK should be considered a state agency.
The court rejected plaintiffs contention that Yugoslav public
ownership of property was determinative on questions of state
agency status on the grounds that such an argument was tantamount to categorizing all enterprises as agencies of the state. The
court felt that it was Congress' intent that the definition of an
agency or instrumentality of a foreign state should be construed
broadly, but "there is no suggestion [in the Act] that a foreign
state's system of property ownership, without more, should be
determinative on the question whether an entity operating within
the state is a state agency or instrumentality under the Act.""
To determine defendant's status the court examined two factors: first, the degree to which the defendant entity discharges a
governmental function, and, second, the extent of government
control of the operations of the entity. The court noted that the
role of a workers' organization in the Yugoslav economy is comparable to a corporation's role in the United States. To the extent
that this analogy is valid, defendant must be discharging a
private, commercial activity. The plaintiff next attempted to show
that the Yugoslav government, through its pervasive set of rules
and regulations, completely controls defendant to such a degree
that it must be considered an agency of the government. It was
noted, however, that the United States Supreme Court has ruled
in domestic sovereign immunity cases that the degree of government regulation is not a conclusive determinant of an agency's
- 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b) (1976).
CONSTITUTION OF THE SOCIALIST FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA,

, 441 F. Supp. at 831.
Id at 832.
'7 I&

Art. XXXV.
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status as a subdivision of the government.4 8 The defendant showed persuasively that, although the Yugoslav government exercised restriction over certain aspects of its operations, the government did not interfere with the day-to-day affairs of the work
organization, and therefore it could not be considered subject to
governmental control.
Since defendant did not meet the requirements for being an
agency of a foreign state under the two tests derived from the
Act, 9 the only other means by which it could be deemed an agency
of the Yugoslav government would be a determination that the
government owned at least fifty per cent of the entity by virtue of
the state's ownership of property. The court summarily rejected
this contention, holding that "this premise, however valid it may
be in political theory, is not present to confer jurisdiction under
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act." Since defendant was not
an organ of the Yugoslav state and was not owned by the state,
the court found that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction under
the Act.
In Yessenin-Volpin, defendants were trying to establish agency
status for the purpose of obtaining immunity from suit by claiming that they were owned by the state according to the provisions
of the Act." The court took a step-by-step approach in comparing
the case with the Act. First, the definition of "foreign state"52 was
closely examined to determine whether defendants might avoid
the exceptions to immunity within the Act. The court was persuaded by affidavits of the Soviet Ambassadors and previous
British case law determining similar issues that TASS was a
foreign agency under the Act. Novosti's position was, however,
not so clear. Both plaintiff and defendant agreed that Novosti was
a separate legal entity and that it was not organized under the
laws of any third country.
Having passed two of the three steps of the cumulative test for
determining status as a "foreign state," the only question remaining was that of ownership. The determination of ownership and
," United States v. Orleans, 425 U.S. 807, 815 (1976).
- 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602-11 (1976).
441 F. Supp. at 832.
21 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b) (1976).
5Id2

Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, the Ambassador of the Soviet Union of the U.S.S.R. Council of
Ministers.
" See Krajina v. The Tass Agency, [1949] 2 All E.R. 274 (C.A.).
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control of Novosti was made much more difficult by the problem
of translating the Soviet concept of property under a socialist
system into the language of the Act. The court noted that sixtythree percent of Novosti's assets were "owned" 5 by the state and
that public organizations such as Novosti are traditionally owned
by the state under Soviet law. The question of ownership was further clouded by the distinction which must be made between
government ownership and enterprise ownership. A detailed examination of the Soviet Constitution reveals that with few exceptions the state is the sole owner of the means of production. 6 The
court found there to be little doubt that Novosti was an agency or
political subdivision of the Soviet government. 7
Generally, foreign states are accorded immunity unless their
acts fall within the scope of one of the exceptions to immunity in
the Act.' Under the commercial activities exception, plaintiff
must prove that the act had a direct effect in the United States,
done in connection with the commercial activity of the foreign
agency. 9 Under the Act, "the commercial character of the activity
shall be determined by reference to the nature of the course of
conduct rather than by reference to its purpose."' The court
found that Novosti had engaged in commercial activity but that
the alleged libel was not committed in connection with such commercial activity. In this case the libel was printed in intragovernmental publications and not through commercially oriented
To figure the percentage of the government's ownership of Novosti, the court concluded
that property valued at 2,941,500 rubles which was owned by the government and used by
Novosti should be counted as the government's contribution to the ownership. This assumption may not be valid because the government still retains complete ownership of the assets
and only lets Novosti use them. At best it could be claimed that the government was contributing an amount equal to the rental value of the property; at worst it could only claim a
fair rate of depreciation on the property, which with appreciating land values or severe inflation could be negligible. At any rate, the government should not be able to include the
property in the calculation of ownership rights when it has only given up the right to use
the property and not the property itself.
G. GUINS. note 2 supra, at 96.
'7 443 F. Supp. at 854.
28 U.S.C. § 1605 (1976).
A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the
United States or the States in any case . . . in which the action is based upon ...
an act outside the territory of the United States in connection with the commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that act causes a direct effect in
the United States.
28 U.S.C. § 1605 (1976).
- 29 U.S.C. § 1603(d) (1976).
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media." The case was dismissed because plaintiff could not defeat
Novosti's claim of sovereign immunity.
In many cases, after applying the restrictive theory of
sovereign immunity, it will not matter whether an enterprise is
classified as an agency of a foreign state if it is found to engage in
commercial or private activity. Thus the plaintiff need not obtain
subject matter jurisdiction over the agency under the Act, but instead can rely upon diversity jurisdiction over the foreign
agency. 2 However, in cases such as Edlow International,where
diversity jurisdiction is not available, classification of the enterprise will make a difference. Usually enterprises will attempt to
show agency status in order to obtain immunity, so this classification should not be taken lightly.
The problem with communist and socialist countries is that,
although political theory suggests that all property is owned and
controlled by the state,63 in reality some enterprises appear to be
independent." The court in Yessenin-Volpin took into consideration the Soviet Union's system of public ownership of property,
whereas the Edlow Internationalcourt found this factor nondeterminative. Complicating this problem is the fact that some enterprises are deemed by their charters to be separate entities, yet in
another part of the same document, they are characterized as
organs of the state. 5 Due to these contradictions, it is very difficult to apply the Act's definition of an agency or instrumentality
of a foreign state to enterprises of socialist states.
1

The alleged libelous remarks were printed in several intergovernmental newsletters,

including Krasnaya Zveda, the Central Organ of the Ministry of Defense of the U.S.S.R.,
Izuestra, the "Organ of the Soviets of Working Peoples Deputies," published by the
Presidium of The Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., and Sovetskaya Rossia (or Russiya), the
"Organ of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, The
Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation of Socialist Soviets Republics (RSFSR) and the
Council of Ministers of the RSFSR." (As translated from defendants affidavits and
exhibits). The court seemed to place a great deal of weight on the fact that these intergovernmental publications should be privileged much as our Congressmen enjoy a conditional privilege when performing the duties of their office, and not within the definition of
commercial activity. Noticeably absent, however, was mention by the court of the extent of
abuse required to lose this privilege.
62 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a) (1976).
See notes 33 and 34 supra.
This point is illustrated by defendant in the principal case of Edlow InternationaL
Defendant for all intents and purposes was a separate entity similar to a corporation or
other private organization. It was set up to be a "workers' organization," separate from the
government of Yugoslavia. Despite the socialist form of government, defendant appeared
on paper to be uncontrolled by the Yugoslav government. See note 2 supra.
' See note 26 supra, and accompanying text.
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The superior approach to the problem was taken by the court in
Edlow InternationaL The court avoided the difficulty of applying
the Act's definition to the socialist enterprise by holding that a
country's system of property ownership, standing alone, is not
determinative on the question of agency status. In deciding
whether the socialist enterprise was an agency of the Yugoslav
government, the court adopted two tests: a "governmental function" test and the control test. Although the degree to which the
entity discharges a governmental function is an important fact to
consider, it is not of itself wholly dispositive of agency status. The
better test is that of control, because it is best fitted to these
socialist enterprises. The control test avoids discussion of the
political theory underlying communist or socialist systems and
focuses on what should be the most important criterion in determining agency status-how much the daily operations of the
enterprise are controlled by the government. By using the test on
a case-by-case basis, courts can base determinations of immunity
solely upon the ultimate question of whether the enterprise is
engaging in commerical or private activity.
Timothy Alan Peterson
Harger W. Hoyt

